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Spain’s economy needs bold leadership to prevent the
collapse of its banks and to reform its labour market
Despite growth and budget surpluses in the lead up to the financial crisis, Spain now faces falling
GDP and high unemployment. Manuel Muniz argues that Spain urgently needs to recapitalize its
banks and to institute economic reforms to increase its competitiveness and bring back growth.
This article originally appeared at Politics in Spires.
The scope and scale of the Eurozone crisis has led many to forget that different countries had very
different economies when the crisis erupted. In an attempt to arrive at general conclusions about the
malaise affecting the economies of the EU we have failed to understand the particularities of each
case.
The most common of these generalisations is that high levels of public debt in the EU periphery are the
overall cause of the its problems. Current debates about the economic situation in Spain, for example,
are centred on the country’s need to reduce its deficit to 5.3% of GDP, as agreed this year with
European partners in Brussels. Just recently, the newly elected Spanish conservative government
succeeded in gaining concessions from the EU and was allowed to exceed the original deficit target of
4.4% of GDP for 2012. The original 3% target for 2013 remains in place; more so after the Fiscal
Compact which will allow for legal action to be taken against those in breach of its stipulations.
However, public spending was not at the core of Spain’s economic problems; nor was the Spanish
complex and wasteful public administration. That the new government has decided to tackle a bloated
and inefficient public sector is of course good news, but such actions alone will not solve the country’s
economic troubles.
Spain was in a truly enviable situation in 2007 and
2008 regarding public spending. It had run a budget
surplus for years and its debt to GDP ratio was well
below 60% in 2008 (compare that to Italy’s 120%).
Even today, after years of recession, stimulus
packages and automatic stabilisers like
unemployment benefits, that figure is below 70%.
However, some worrying signs existed back in the late
1990′s and early 2000′s. Two were the most
significant. The first was a massive trade deficit, led by
long-running Spanish energy dependency, and above
all, by a recurring loss of competitiveness. At its peak
in 2008 that deficit was close to 10% of GDP, and
today, after four years of economic slowdown, it
remains at 6.5% (giving Spain’s trade deficit figure the
rare honour of being ranked 176 out of 210 countries
listed in the CIA World Factbook). Not surprisingly
Spain’s current account balance threw a deficit of
close to $61 Billion in 2011, making it, again, one of
the largest in the world.
The second source of worry was an ever growing reliance on the construction sector. In 2007
construction represented around 16% of Spanish GDP and employed 12% of its work force. The real
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estate boom meant that at its peak more houses were being built in Spain than in the rest of the EU put
together. This is despite Spain representing less than 10% of the Union’s population and an equal
amount its total territory. The boom in construction was made possible by low Euro interest rates and a
rapid increase in private debt. By the year 2005 the average Spanish household had accumulated debt
equivalent to 125% of the combined annual income of its members.
In 2007 things started to change. There were signs that
the real estate bubble was about to burst. For the first
time since 1998 household prices froze (they had risen
on average around 150% since the late 90′s). It was
not long before credit for further development or for the
purchase of new homes fell. As Spain struggled with
the collapse of one of the pillars of its economic
success, the financial crisis broke out, first in the
United States and shortly after everywhere else.
Economies dependent on credit like that of Spain
were hit hard by the rapid decline in liquidity. With
further strains on credit, consumption collapsed and
the real estate sector was all but brought to a halt. In
2009, Spain entered a recession for the first time in 16
years, when GDP fell by 3.9%. In January of this year
the IMF announced its revised figures for the Spanish
economy predicting an extension of the recession with
a 1.7% fall of GDP in 2012 and of 0.3% in 2013
(previous estimates had shown GDP growing by 1.1%
this year and 1.8% in 2013). All the while,
unemployment rose rapidly from around 8% in 2008 to
over 20% in 2010. Current government estimates
place that figure over the 24% mark for the year 2012.
Digging out
So where does all this leave us? First of all it must enable us to understand that Spain’s problems are
very specific to its recent history and have a lot to do with its economic model. Indeed Spain has to
deal with the collapse of the real estate sector, where a lot still needs to be done, and at the same time,
rebuild its economy on a more solid footing.
The European Central Bank’s 3-year longer term financing operation (LTRO) announced in December
of 2011 has, according to a growing number of analysts, brought the Eurozone crisis to an end (see
below for a depiction of this sophisticated monetary policy).
European private lenders accessed the ECB’s cheap
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European private lenders accessed the ECB’s cheap
loans and used them to purchase Eurozone sovereign
debt drastically bringing down treasury yields. Spanish
banks alone used around 25% of the 1€ Trillion made
available by the ECB. The Spanish government, in
turn, profited greatly from the initiative and saw its 10-
year bond yields fall from 6.7% in the winter of 2011 to
below 5% in early 2012. Somewhat hidden from view
is the fact that the LTRO is also a program to
capitalise the banks given that they pay around 1% to
the ECB and are buying sovereign debt at close to
5%. However, it is precisely the health of its banking
sector that makes Spain a worrying exception. If the
worsening of the national economy was to continue
Spanish banks could be in dire need of
recapitalisation in order to provision for heavy losses
on real estate related debt.
It is estimated that in 2011 property related loans in
Spain amounted to 1€ trillion, which would be very
close to Spain’s annual GDP. Out of that around 140€ billion have already gone bad. Overall real
estate related debt is around one quarter of the Spanish domestic financial market. Housing prices
have fallen since 2007 by an average of 22% (compared to over 40% in Ireland) although a clear
acceleration in the drop has been felt in late 2011. It is expected that prices will continue to fall, and with
unemployment rising it is only reasonable to expect further trouble for Spanish financial institutions
holding large amounts of real estate debt.
Anticipating this scenario, in February, the new Spanish government announced new bank regulations
that will see national banks increase their capital by around 50€ billion. The European Commission,
meanwhile, is reported to be moving slowly towards the idea that further capitalisation will be needed,
expected to be an additional 50€ billion. Such a figure is significantly more than the 35€ billion budget
reduction that the Spanish government is attempting to achieve in 2012. If another round of aggressive
recapitalisation is needed it would not be extraordinary to see Spain having to bail out some of the
smaller and more exposed regional banks (particularly the politically influenced Cajas which have
historically lent to high risk real estate developers and home buyers). Further pressure on the budget
can only lead to a bailout from the EU with strict economic oversight.
This leads us to the second big problem that Spain
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This leads us to the second big problem that Spain
faces: The dire need for overarching economic reforms
that increase its competitiveness and bring back growth.
This is, of course, easier said than done. It is however
evident by now that the main problem in Spain’s
economy is its labour market. Collective bargaining
arrangements, which sanctioned the imposition of what
was agreed by very few on entire sectors of the
economy, as well as the high cost of firing employees
produced terrible imbalances in the market, and an
overall rigid and unproductive economy. It is truly
unsurprising that youth unemployment in Spain is close
to 50% and that a two tier labour market has emerged
with highly paid and highly protected work being an
oddity, and poorly paid temporary work being the norm.
The recent reform of the labour market is probably not as
profound as it should have been and has led to a general
strike, taking place as this article is being written. The
lack of productivity is also an issue. According to World
Bank data, Spanish labour productivity fell by about 0.5%
from 2002 to 2008 when it was expected to rise by over
4%. In 2002 average annual labour productivity in Spain was around $42,000, compared to $61,000 in
Germany or $83,000 in the United States. Unit labour costs in Spain are unsurprisingly well above
those of other Eurozone members.
If Spain is to overcome the current crisis it is to tackle, first and foremost, the problems indicated
above. It has to come to grips with the lingering real estate crisis and protect its banks from the
excessive risk they exposed themselves to during the boom years. This will mean recapitalising banks
well beyond the $50 billion announced, in anticipation of a further decline in real estate value. The time
for this has now arrived. However, what is truly needed is a new economic model based on a
productive and competitive labour market capable of creating exportable goods and services. That will
take a generation and will require large-scale reforms in the failing Spanish educational system,
reducing business regulations and a commitment to innovation.
Keeping the budget deficit in line should be a key objective of the Spanish government. However the
true problems of Spain’s economy have been high levels of private debt, which fed a truly enormous
real estate bubble, and an uncompetitive labour market. These issues were worryingly present during
the years of growth and are present now, very much driving the recession. The future of Spain will
therefore depend not so much on fiscal discipline as on how decidedly and effectively those underlying
problems are tackled.
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